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abstract
It  has been long known (Perry (1977,  1979),  Lewis (1981))  that  de se  attitudes,  such as 
beliefs  and desires that  one has  about  oneself,  call  for  a  special  treatment  in theories  of 
attitudinal content. The aim of this paper is to raise similar concerns for theories of asserted 
content. The received view, inherited from Kaplan (1989),  has it that if Alma says “I am 
hungry,” the asserted content, or  what is said, is the proposition that Alma is hungry (at a 
given  time).  I  argue  that  the  received  view has  difficulties  handling  de  se  assertion,  i.e. 
contents that one expresses using the first person pronoun, to assert something about oneself. 
I start from the observation that when two speakers say “I am hungry,” one may truly report 
them as having said the same thing. It has often been held that the possibility of such reports 
comes from the fact that the two speakers are, after all, uttering the same words, and are in 
this sense “saying the same thing”. I argue that  this approach fails,  and that it  is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to use the same words, or words endowed with the same meaning, in 
order to be truly reported as same-saying. I also argue that reports of same-saying in the case 
of  de se  assertion differ significantly from such reports in the case of two speakers merely 
implicating the same thing.  
§1. The received wisdom on what is said
In philosophy of language, the dominant view regarding indexicals' contribution to content, 
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inherited from the work of David Kaplan (1989), has it that what is said by a speaker using a 
sentence that contains an indexical pronoun (or the 'content', in Kaplan's terms) differs from 
the lexical meaning of the sentence (or its 'character') in that, on the one hand, it includes the 
specification of the pronoun's referent (as determined in the context of utterance), but, on the 
other, does not include the lexically encoded conditions that help determining the referent, 
such as the condition of being female in the case of  'she',  or of the condition of being a 
speaker in the case of 'I'. Suppose that on Friday May 15, 2012, at noon, Alma says:
(1)  I am hungry.
According  to the Kaplanian view,  the  meaning of the sentence  in (1)  is a  function from 
contexts to contents which, given a context, returns the proposition that the speaker of that 
context is hungry at the time of the context, while  what is said  by (1), or, equivalently, its 
content, is the output of that function as applied to the context of (1), hence the proposition 
that Alma is hungry on May 15, 2012, at noon. 
Let me clarify from the outset that my target in this paper is not Kaplan's semantic account 
of indexicals, but rather, an account of what is said that builds directly upon Kaplan's notion 
of 'what is said'. In other words, the issue is whether the Kaplanian notion of content is able to 
account for the content of assertion and for what is said, where the latter is taken to be what 
calls for analysis, rather than just another technical notion.1 Since I do not want to engage into 
Kaplan scholarship, I shall speak of the  Kaplanian  account, whether or not Kaplan himself 
would have subscribed to it.           
There are two intertwined motivations for the Kaplanian account. Suppose that at the time 
at which Alma utters (1), Bruce, pointing at her, says:
1 There is some unclarity in Kaplan's writings as to the status of his notion of what is said, 
since he seems to move back and forth between a stronger view, on which his notion of 
content (qua something that, when evaluated at a circumstance, gives a truth value) is meant 
to account for our pre-theoretical, intuitive notion of what is said, and a weaker view, on 
which 'what is said' is merely another “technical” term for the notion of (semantic) content. 
Note that even if we take him to have held the weaker view, it may still be said that the force of 
Kaplan's arguments often draws on our intuitive notion of what is said. 
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(2)  She is hungry.
Then we can truly report Bruce as having said in (2) what Alma said in (1). Indeed, they both 
said that Alma was hungry. Or, suppose that on Saturday May 16, Chris says:
(3)  Alma was hungry yesterday at noon.
Again, it seems that one may truly report Alma and Chris as having said the same thing on the 
grounds of their utterances of (1) and (3).2
The previous examples involve speakers who same-say using sentences whose meanings 
are not the same. The second motivation for the Kaplanian view concerns speakers who use 
sentences with the same meaning, yet fail to same-say. Suppose that on Saturday, May 16, 
2009, Chris says:
(4)  I am hungry.
Those who share Kaplan's intuitions would insist that what is said by Alma in (1) and what is 
said by Chris is (4) are different things: 
What  is  said  in  using  a  given  indexical  in  different  contexts  may  be 
different. Thus if I say, today, “I was insulted yesterday,” and you utter the 
same words tomorrow, what is said is  different  […] There are possible 
circumstances in which what I said would be true but what you said would 
be false. Thus we say different things (Kaplan 1989: 500).3 
2 Note that this motivation relies not only on, as it were, our direct intuitions about what is said, but 
also on our intuitions on same-saying, and on our practices of reporting what is said. On the 
relationship between the notion of what is said and the relationship of same-saying, see Everett (2000) 
discussion. Here and in what follows, I shall assume that there is a tight connection between what is 
said and what gets reported in reports of what is said. I take that to be a relatively uncontroversial 
assumption, even though it is, in principle, possible that the notion of what is said might have little or 
nothing to do with reports of what is said (as has been held, for instance, by Bach (2001)). 
3 Although Kaplan was arguably the first to systematically distinguish between lexically encoded 
meaning and what is said, both insights go back at least to Frege, who wrote: “The sentence ‘I am cold’ 
expresses a different thought in the mouth of one person from what it expresses in the mouth of 
another. [...] It is not necessary that the person who feels cold should himself give utterance to the 
thought that he feels cold. Another person can do this by using a name to designate the one who feels 
cold” (1899: 236).
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§2. De se assertion
It has been pointed out many times (e.g. Feldman 1980: 80, Lewis 1980: 97) that cases such 
as (1)-(4), in which the sentence “I am hungry” is uttered by different speakers, are as much 
of a problem for the Kaplanian view as they are a motivation for it.  On the one hand,  a 
proponent of the Kaplanian view is arguably right to say that, in some sense, what Alma says 
in (1) is different from what Chris says in (4). As we have seen, Alma's utterance of (1) says, 
in some sense, the same thing as (2) or (3), but there seems to be no sense in which Chris's 
utterance of (4) says the same thing as either (2) or (3). But on the other hand, there is, to use 
Lewis's words, an “equally legitimate” sense in which Alma in (1) and Chris in (4) do say the 
same thing. Indeed, each says that he or she is hungry.
The  intuition  that  Alma in  (1)  and Chris  in (4)  same-say  is  further  supported  by our 
linguistic practices of reporting what is said. Consider the following dialogue:
(5)  Chris:   I am hungry.
(6)  Bruce:   Alma said that, too.
Bruce's report in (6) is ambiguous. It can be understood as reporting Alma to have said that 
Chris was hungry, or that she herself was hungry.4 This ambiguity is very similar to the well-
known syntactic ambiguity with VP-ellipsis. Suppose that Bruce says: 
(7)  I love my wife, and so does Chris.
On its “strict” reading, (7) says that Chris loves Bruce's wife, while on its “sloppy” reading, it 
says that Chris loves  his own wife. Given this apparent similarity, I will use the 'strict' vs. 
'sloppy' terminology for the ambiguity that we find with reports of same-saying such as (6).5 
4 As a matter of fact, the report in (6) is four-ways ambiguous because of the contribution of the present 
tense: it can report Alma as having said that Chris was hungry at the time when she said it, or that he is 
hungry at the time of (5), or that she was hungry at the time when she said it, or that she is hungry at 
the time of (5). For the sake of simplicity, I will leave aside all the issues raised by the contribution of 
tense.
5 Note that I am not claiming that the ambiguity in (6) must be the same phenomenon as the ambiguity 
that we find VP-ellipsis. What is more, there is no consensus whether the strict/sloppy ambiguity in the 
latter case is to be handled within syntax alone or, rather, (syntax combined with) semantics and 
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§3. Saying the same thing vs. using the same words
In the previous section, we saw that when different people say "I am hungry," there is a sense 
in which they  are  saying the same thing,  for  each  is  saying that  he  or  she  is  hungry.  A 
response readily available to the Kaplanian is to point out that the same sentence is being 
uttered, and that this could explain why we are inclined to hear the two speakers as saying the 
same thing – for, after all, they are uttering the same words. In this section, I will show that 
this is not the right approach to the problem of de se assertion. Although the use of one and 
the same sentence may partly account for the intuition that the same thing has been said, that 
cannot be the end of the story, since, as I will show, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
the speakers to be using the same sentence in order to be reported, literally and truly, as same-
saying. I will first provide cases in which speakers are using sentences that have different 
meanings as well as different  contents (relative to their respective contexts), yet there is a 
sense in which they are saying the same thing, as robust as in the case of (1)-(4). Then I will 
provide cases in which two speakers are using the same sentence, but when we report them as 
same-saying, the report comes out false.
§3.1. Different meanings, different contents, same thing said
Imagine a situation in which Alma, Bruce and Chris have attended Prof. Cheng's lecture on 
Montague on Monday evening. During the lecture, Bruce tells Chris: 
(8)  I really like this lecture. 
Several days later, in a conversation with Chris about recent lectures that they have attended, 
Alma says:
(9)  I really liked Prof. Cheng's lecture on Montague last Monday.
Chris may then truly reply to Alma:
pragmatics. For discussion, see e.g. Lappin (1996).
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(10) That's what Bruce said, too.
The sentences used by Alma and Bruce are different, and so are their lexical meanings. What 
is more, the differences at stake are quite significant: where (8) contains a demonstrative, (9) 
contains a complex definite description, and while (8) contains present tense, (9) is in the past 
tense. The Kaplanian contents associated with (8) and (9) are also different, the one involving 
Bruce, and the one, Alma. Despite all this, the report in (10) is ambiguous and has a true, 
sloppy reading, on which Bruce is reported to have said that  he liked Cheng's lecture. This 
reading will be dominant if, for instance, it is common knowledge in the context of (10) that 
Bruce has no idea who Alma is and could not have said anything explicitly about her.
§3.2. Same meanings, different things said
Just  as  using  the  same  sentence  is  not  required  for  same-saying,  it  is  not  enough either. 
Consider the following pair of dialogues:
(i) de se assertion
(11) I am a fool. (Alma talking to Chris)
(12) I am a fool. (Bruce talking to Chris)
(13) That's what Alma said, too. (Chris's reply to Bruce)
(ii) de te assertion 
(14) You are a fool. (Prof. Cheng talking to Alma, overheard by Chris)
(15) You are a fool. (Chris talking to Bruce)
(16) (?) That's what Prof. Cheng said, too. (Chris talking to Bruce again)
There is an interesting asymmetry between the 1st person and the 2nd person pronoun in how 
they  behave in  reported  speech.  Consider  (13).  As  it  stands,  it  has  two readings:  a  strict 
reading, which reports Alma to have said that Bruce was a fool, and a sloppy reading, which 
reports her as having said that she herself was a fool. If it is, say, common knowledge in the 
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context of (13) that Alma would have never said such a thing about Bruce, the immediately 
available reading of (13) will be its sloppy reading, and (13) will be true in virtue of Alma's 
having uttered (11). However, if we try the same sort of sloppy report by simply replacing 'I' 
by 'you', such a report will be typically unavailable. Unless the reporter notes that the reportee 
was talking to someone else, and unless there is something peculiar about the context of the 
same-saying report,  (16) will  not  be  ambiguous,  but  downright false (assuming that  Prof. 
Cheng never said that Bruce was a fool). 
The asymmetry between the 1st person pronoun and the 3rd person pronoun is even more 
striking. Consider the following case, minimally different from (i) or (ii):
(iii) de re assertion
(17) She is a fool. (Prof. Cheng, talking of Alma)
(18) She is a fool. (Chris, pointing at Daisy)
(19) (?) That's what Professor Cheng said, too. (in reply to Chris)
Again, in an ordinary context, (19), as it stands, is not ambiguous. Only one reading seems to 
be available, namely, the one on which Cheng said that Daisy was a fool.
To  forestall  a  possible  misunderstanding,  I  am  not  claiming  that  there  is  no  sense 
whatsoever in which Cheng in (14) and Chris in (15) could be taken to have said the same 
thing. For instance, we may take them to be same-saying insofar as they are both saying of 
their addressee that he or she is a fool. But if this should serve as grounds for reporting what 
they said as being the same, the mere report in (16) won't  do. In general, what is further 
required is that the reporter should make it explicit that the addressee was someone else, as in:
(20) That's what Professor Cheng said, too, to Alma. (Chris talking to Bruce)
The report in (20) is, again, ambiguous between a sloppy reading, on which Cheng said to 
Alma that she was a fool, and a strict reading, on which Cheng is reported as having said to 
Alma that Bruce was a fool. 
The Problem of De Se Assertion 7
With the 3rd person pronoun, one can similarly report that the same thing has been said, 
provided that one makes it explicit that it was said about different people. Thus the following 
report, based on Cheng's utterance of (17), becomes correct:
(21) That's what Professor Cheng said, too, about Alma. 
There is, then, an interesting  asymmetry between de se assertion and the other cases, since 
the former, unlike the latter, is such that the reporter does not have to make it explicit that the 
reportee was talking about herself or himself.6 This asymmetry raises the following problem. 
Suppose that  Kaplanian contents  play the role of  what  is  said.  Then,  (11)  and (12) have 
different contents, and still, in an important sense, they say the same thing: in both cases, the 
speaker is saying of herself or himself that she or he is a fool. This sense of same-saying is 
further reflected in the fact that, properly disambiguated, the report in (13) is true. Now, a 
Kaplanian might think that this is because the sentences uttered in (11) and (12) are the same. 
However, this explanation won't work. Take (14)-(15) and (17)-(18). There, too, the sentences 
uttered are the same, but we do not get a sloppy reading for either (16) or (19). In ordinary 
contexts, such reports will not be ambiguous, but false. 
To bring the point home, what the cases discussed in this section suggest is that something 
is still missing in the account that the Kaplanian view gave us for the de se cases in the first 
place. Recall how the dialectics goes. The Kaplanian view predicts that if different speakers 
say "I am hungry", they are saying different things. Faced with the observation that we often 
hear, and report, such speakers as same-saying, the Kaplanian notes that this must be because 
the speakers, although saying different things, are using the same sentence, and are thereby 
prone to being perceived as same-saying. Now, if this were the whole story, one would expect 
6 Note that it is sometimes possible to have sloppy same-saying reports even with the 2nd or 3rd person, 
without making it explicit that the person talked to or about was someone else. Here is a tentative 
example. Suppose that Bruce and Chris had a blind date each on Saturday evening. On Sunday, when 
Alma asks him how the date went, Bruce tells her, “She was obnoxious.” Later, Chris, talking about his 
own date, tells Alma, “She was obnoxious.” Alma may then truly reply “Bruce said that, too.” The 
report is acceptable because the context makes it sufficiently clear that Bruce must have been talking of 
his own date. My point is not that sloppy same-saying reports with the 2nd or 3rd person are impossible, 
but rather, that it ordinary contexts, they are simply unavailable. 
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that in other cases in which the speakers are using the same sentence, as in (14)-(15) or in 
(17)-(18), they would be just as prone to being perceived, and reported, as same-saying. Yet, 
as we saw, this is not what happens. What the Kaplanian still owes us, then, is an account of 
the asymmetry in reporting same-saying when the target sentences use the 1st person pronoun 
vs. the 2nd or 3rd person pronoun. What is more, we have pointed out that there are cases of de 
se assertion, viz. (8)-(9), in which we hear, and report, the speakers as same-saying, even 
though they are not using the same sentence (and not expressing the same Kaplanian contents 
either). Since the same-sentence explanation fails to apply to such cases, the Kaplanian owes 
us another explanation. To be sure, neither of these two challenges shows that the Kaplanian 
account is wrong or untenable; what it shows is that, qua an account of the intuitive notion of 
what is said, it is in need of further development. 
§4. De se assertion vs. the other senses of 'what is said'  
It is possible that what I have described as a received view may well no longer be one. There 
is a growing number of Kaplan's followers who, while fully endorsing his semantics, do not 
want to identify semantic content with what is said. Among such semi-Kaplanians one finds 
e.g. Salmon (1986) and Soames (2002), to mention only those two. The idea, which seems to 
be more and more widespread, is that the notion of what is said is simply too versatile and too 
heavily context-dependent to be possible to capture by means of the notion of content. 
One of the first to have pointed out that Kaplan's identification of semantic content with 
what is said was unwarranted was David Lewis: 
“Unless we give it some special technical meaning, the locution ‘what is 
said’ is very far from univocal. It can mean the propositional content, in 
Stalnaker's sense (horizontal or diagonal). It can mean the exact words. I 
suspect that it can mean almost anything in between” (1980: 97).. 
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In  addition  to  the  senses  mentioned  by  Lewis,  there  is  also  was  Ziff  (1972)  called  the 
implication sense  of  what  is  said.  Suppose  that  Bruce  is  thinking  of  enrolling  in  Prof. 
Blanchet's logic class and asks Alma what she thought about it. She says:
(22) I don't think I've ever been in such a boring class in my whole life. 
Then he asks Daisy, and she says:
(23) That class is a sheer waste of time!
It is easy to imagine Bruce replying to Daisy:
(24) That's what Alma said, too. 
Reports such as (24) are very natural and ubiquitous, but the relevant sense of same-saying 
cannot be captured by either lexical meaning or Kaplanian content, or even any combination 
of the two. This presses even further the worry whether one could ever account for the notion 
of what is said by pinning it down to something as stiff as the notion of semantic content.7 
In the context of the present discussion, the plurality of senses connected with the locution 
'what is said' raises the following worry: the sort of cases that I brought up in section 3.1. 
against the Kaplanian view, aren't they just another garden-variety of the many senses of 'what 
is said'? In the remainder of this section, my goal will be to show that there is a significant 
difference between reports of same-saying in the case of de se assertion and reports such as 
(24), which rely on the implication sense of what is said. 
Reconsider (24). Even if we take this report to be true in the context at stake, someone who 
witnessed Alma's utterance of (21) may justifiedly challenge Bruce (the reporter) as follows: 
(25) No, Alma didn't quite say that. She only said that she had never been in such a boring 
class. That need not mean that the class is a waste of time. 
Presented with such a challenge, Bruce will normally retract, or at least somehow qualify his 
report, for instance as follows: 
7 Note that for radical contextualists such as Recanati (2004), the context-dependence of what is said 
serves as evidence to argue that pragmatics intrudes into semantics. As for those who, against such 
objections, defend a purely semantic notion of what is said, see e.g. Bach (2001).
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(26) OK, she didn't quite say that, but that's what she meant. 
This retraction doesn't necessarily show that the report in (24) was false.8 But what it shows is 
that the sense of same-saying relevant to the truth of such reports is not its most literal sense, 
but rather, a looser sense. Now, compare this with the case of de se assertion:
(27) Alma: I am hungry.
(28) Chris: I am hungry.
(29) Bruce: Alma said that, too.
(30) Daisy: (?) No, she didn't quite say that. She only said that she was hungry.
Faced with Daisy's challenge, Bruce will not retract his report in (29) – rather, he will point 
out that he was precisely reporting Alma as saying that she was hungry, and that Daisy simply 
failed to disambiguate his report properly. Once again, there is a striking similarity with VP-
ellipsis:
(31) Chris: I love my wife.
(32) Alma: So does Bruce.
(33) Daisy: (?) No, he doesn't. He only loves his own wife.
Daisy's objection in (33) is off the target, just as it was in (30). In both cases, her attempt 
at denying her interlocutor's report merely emphasizes the fact that the report was ambiguous 
– she denies the reading not intended by the reporter precisely in order to assert the intended 
reading, and this is why (30) and (33) sound infelicitous. 
The lesson to be drawn from these examples is that reports of same-saying in the case of 
de  se  assertion  pattern  differently  from such  reports  in  the  other  cases  known from the 
literature. In those other cases, there is evidence that the locution 'what is said' is used loosely 
8 Some will be tempted to see the challenge in (24) and Bruce's retraction in (25) as evidence that the 
report in (24) had been false all along. If so, this would make my point even more straightforward, 
since, as we will shortly see, reports of same-saying in the case of de se assertion cannot be challenged 
by “she didn't quite say that” and remain literally true, unlike reports such as (24). 
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rather than literally.9 On the other hand, the sense of same-saying deployed in reports of de se 
assertion belongs squarely among literal uses.10
§5. Concluding remarks  
My aim in this paper has been to point out some problems for the received view regarding 
indexicals' contribution to the asserted content, on which regardless of whether we use the 
first, second or third person pronoun, the content, or what is said, will be the same provided 
that the referent is the same. I have argued that  the received view can only handle a limited 
range of cases, and that there is no straightforward amendment that would allow it to handle 
the rest. In particular, the idea that speakers who say “I am hungry” may be truly reported to 
have said the same thing because they have used the same sentence is unsatisfactory, as I 
argued in section 3. On the one hand, speakers who say “She is hungry” may be truly reported 
to have said the same thing only if their uses of 'she' refer to the same individual (or else, if 
the reporter makes it explicit, or if the context makes it sufficiently clear, that they said it 
about  different individuals). On the other hand, there are cases of  de se  assertion in which 
speakers  are  truly  reported  as  same-saying  even  though  they  are  using  sentences  with 
sometimes  very  different  lexical  meanings.  In  section  4,  I  considered  another  possible 
9 There need not be a sharp distinction between loose and literal uses – it is enough for my argument 
that there be uses that are more literal than others. Also, let me stress once again that a report in which 
'what is said' is used loosely need not be ipso facto false. All that matters is that, if challenged, the 
reporter feels the need of qualifying or retracting his or her report.
10 Let me acknowledge that the range of patterns that one would need to look at in order to provide a 
thorough account of same-saying reports goes far beyond the sorts of case that I have considered here.  
For instance, suppose that Alma says “The logic class is terribly boring” and that Bruce tells Prof. 
Blanchet “Your class is terribly boring. That's what Alma said, too.” One should be able to challenge 
Bruce by pointing out that Alma never said to Prof. Blanchet that her class was boring, or even that 
Prof. Blanchet's class is boring. While such cases involving definite descriptions seem to fall on the 
'literal' side of what is said, they also exhibit certain features of looseness. Although it would be 
interesting and worthwhile to compare same-saying report patterns in the de se cases and the cases 
involving definite descriptions, that would be a separate issue with only indirect bearings on the more 
basic distinction that I have been focusing on in this paper. Let me also emphasize that the phenomenon 
of de se assertion is wider than the use of the 1st person pronoun. Thus it has been held e.g. by Egan 
(2007) that when we use epistemic modals, we assert contents whose truth values depend on centered 
worlds (i.e. not only on what the world is like, but on what it is like from an individual's perspective).
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approach to the notion of what is said, which holds that this notion, as well as the relation of 
same-saying, are just too heavily context-dependent to be analyzable by means of the notion 
of semantic content. While acknowledging that we may often report same-saying in cases in 
which neither the Kaplanian contents nor the de se contents are the same, I showed that there 
was still a significant difference between these reports, which are easy to challenge and thus 
suggest that the relevant sense of 'what is said' is a loose one, and reports of same-saying in 
the cases of de se assertion, which, when challenged, reveal that there was genuine ambiguity 
in the report, and thus fall together with the (more) literal uses of the locution 'what is said'. 
By way of a final remark, let me note that the data that I have presented, and the related 
problems for the Kaplanian view that I have raised, need not be seen as insuperable obstacles. 
Perhaps there are amendments to the view that would enable it to handle the data. However, 
the most straightforward ones fall short of accounting for the cases discussed, and for what 
seems to be a privileged status that the first  person pronoun has not only in the realm of 
thought (as has been long known from the literature on  de se  attitudes and on the essential 
indexical), but also in language.
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